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Abstract
This paper is based on the traditional Austrian Theory of Capital which deals with expected
values of future returns of investments over various periods of time. The longer the time
period that elapses between the beginning of a production process and its end, the higher the
(expected) productivity must be due to positive time preferences of individuals. This paper
focuses on the uncertainty of future returns and on uncertainty preferences, instead. Based on
the Hayekian idea of the dispersion of knowledge in society, it will be shown that there is a
systematic relationship between the structure of capital and uncertainty. This result will be
derived for a production process characterized by complete vertical integration and one which
is not completely vertically integrated. The distinction between these two settings is crucial, if
one accepts the distinction between an individual and a social period of production and the
planning horizon which are introduced in this paper.
JEL: B13, D213
Introduction
Problems of capital and finance are reduced to trivial questions of market allocations by the
specific  set-up  of  microeconomic  theory.  As  inputs  are  transformed  into  output
instantaneously, the proceeds of the output can be used to pay for the inputs necessary.
1 The
only relevant constraint the firm faces is that the optimal output must be feasible – it must be
within the bounds of the production possibility set. This constraint is fully defined by
technology. Standard microeconomic theory, therefore, focuses on marginal productivity and
the marginal rate of technical substitution, but neglects the financial aspects of production,
such as funding initial set-up costs, fixed and working capital, and investments to expand the
production possibility set. The concepts of time and uncertainty (modeled in terms of additive
subjective probability, i.e. as risk) receive some attention in models of complete markets
and/or sequential trade.
2 However, their structure implies that capital and finance do not
receive sufficient attention in standard micro-economics. Therefore, the income-effect is not
included in the Slutsky-equation of the firm. The stability- and uniqueness-conditions of the
general equilibrium are all based on the characteristics of the demand functions
3.
Austrian Capital Theory (ACT) has focused on the concept of time as early as 1871, when
Menger’s Principles were first published. In the first section I will outline the basic concepts
of ACT. Distinctions between the individual and the social period of production, as well as
the planning horizon will be made. In the second section the prominent role of uncertainty in
Austrian Economics will be emphasized. Both dimensions of time and uncertainty featured
equally prominently in Menger’s Principles. The role of uncertainty in ACT will be analyzed
in  the  forth  section  based  on  the  distinction  between  production  processes  which  are
characterized by complete vertical integration and those which are not. Building up on4
Hayek’s analysis of the consequences of the dispersion of knowledge in society, I will
demonstrate that the structure of capital is inherently related to the dimension of uncertainty.
The last section concludes and points at further research topics in the ACT.
1. Foundations of Austrian Capital Theory
The Austrian School of Economics emphasizes the structuralist interpretation of economic
phenomena. Streissler (1969) defines its research agenda predominantly via this approach. He
refers to structuralist as “... the explicit development of aspects of dispersion, of variances as
such, the focus on heterogeneity as central theoretical vision. ... the decomposition of
aggregates in order to increase the explanatory content which can be derived by viewing the
aggregates as undifferentiated wholes.” (Streissler (1969:241); original emphasis).
Menger accentuates the decomposition of the entire spectrum of goods with regard to the
causal relation of each good to the satisfaction of individual desires. This relation can be a
direct one – as is the case for first order (or consumer) goods – or an indirect one – as is the
case for higher order goods, leaving the goods-character unaffected.
4 Menger’s Law then
states that the value of goods depends solely on the expected value consumers attach to the
corresponding first order goods. The values of higher order goods are derived from them on
the basis of their marginal (value) product.
5 The value of a good is not directly related to the
value and/or quantities of higher order goods used in its production.
6 That implies that
production costs are completely irrelevant ex-post. Current and past prices can at best serve as
starting points to forecast future prices. These forecasts of future prices of lower order goods
can,  in  turn,  influence  the  current  prices  of  the  higher  order  goods  required  in  their
production.
7 The Austrian theory of value is therefore forward looking.
The purpose of entrepreneurial activity is to adapt the existing structure of production5
(including technology, quantity and quality of capital, distribution of ownership) to expected
changes in the economic conditions, and to exploit subjective profit opportunities, which arise
from differences between the expected future prices of lower order goods and their production
costs. These arise, if the prices of higher order goods do not reflect the subjective, discounted
expectations of their future marginal value product. Therefore, production is always a
decision under uncertainty and based on subjective expectations.
8 As these can be different
among entrepreneurs, their success can be markedly different too.
9
The distinction between risk and uncertainty becomes blurred when one relies on additive
subjective probabilities assigned to all possible states of the world to model uncertainty (as
opposed to risk).
10 Such interpretations assume that ( i) all possible states are known to the
individual a-priori, (ii)  the  individual  is  in  a  position  to  make  the  required  reliable
assignments which can be represented by an additive probability distribution, (iii) the
individual is indifferent with respect to different degrees of ambiguity, vagueness (or
reliability and confidence) associated with different assignments. Non of these restrictive
assumptions are compatible with the notion of uncertainty. In order to deal with subjective
attitudes towards uncertainty, the notion of uncertainty aversion is adopted.
11 Dow and
Werlang (1992:200) develop a measure of it as the deviation of the sum of the assigned
subjective probabilities from additivity. They stress that “the nonadditive prior represents both
the presence of uncertainty and the agent’s aversion to it.” (Dow and Werlang 1992:199).
They also argue that nonadditive priors in the same possible events (which are not necessarily
all known to the individual) can be ranked according to their degree of uncertainty aversion
based on the deviation from additivity, i.e. the larger the deviation, the larger the uncertainty
aversion. The nonadditivity of probabilities does not refer to objective probabilities, but to
individual assignments of subjective probability. The individual wants to retain the possibility6
to assign further subjective probabilities to hitherto unknown events without necessarily
changing the assignments already in place. An alternative interpretation holds that individuals
systematically undervalue probabilities (relative to the Bayesian probabilities
12) associated
with ambiguous events and overvalue those associated with unambiguous ones.
13 The weights
reflect  the  individual’s  confidence  in  the  respective  probability  assignments.  As  the
uncertainty associated with an investment project increases
14, the sum of the nonadditive
priors decreases, the deviation from unity increases and, consequently, the expected utility
falls.
15 In order to maintain a certain level of expected utility as uncertainty increases, the
uncertainty averse individual demands a compensation (an uncertainty premium), an increase
in the pay-off in at least one state of the world with a positive subjective probability, to
compensate for the fall in the sum of the probabilities.
The misunderstanding that the order of goods is based on objective criteria has led to
confusion in the past, and has laid the foundation for unjustified criticism by Marshall,
Knight, Sraffa and many others, who have accused ACT of circularity. Any particular good
can be employed in more than one stage of production and, in many cases, serve as a
consumption good as well.
16 Coal can be a first order (consumption) good, if it is used by a
consumer to heat his apartment. If it is utilized in the production of steel the very same
commodity is a good of a higher order than the steel which it aids to produce. There is no
objective criterion on which this distinction can be based.
17
The demand for a higher order good depends upon the various ways it can be employed in
production. The order of goods is therefore an order of demand functions which comprise
different determinants at each stage of production. The demand for a particular good (e.g.
coal) in stage i depends on the demand for a sub-set of goods of order 1 to (i – 1). The sub-set
consists of all goods of order 1 to (i – 1), which are produced by employing the good (e.g.7
coal) under consideration as an input (directly or indirectly). At the same time the demand for
the particular good in stage i is completely independent of the demand functions of all goods
of order (i + 1) – it is independent of the historical costs of its inputs. This implies that the
demand  for  all  goods  is  a  function  of  the  expected  demand  for  goods  of  order 1 –
consumption goods, which again corresponds to Menger’s Law.
ACT also implies that goods of higher order are complementary, since the transformation of
one higher order good into one of lower order regularly requires one or more other higher
order goods.
18 This transformation is a process requiring time. The concept of time is central
to the Austrian Theory of Capital. But the relevant notion is not an objective one. The average
period of production is a technological ex-post concept and should therefore be irrelevant for
ACT. Böhm-Bawerk’s attempts to reduce capital theory to the time dimension alone has
earned him the criticism of Menger.
19 The emphasis must be placed on the ex-ante, subjective
concept of the planning horizon (or the expected production time). This concept dates back to
Menger (1950:152) and was stressed by Streissler (1973:170) as well as Kirzner (1996:43).
In a recent paper Samuelson (2001) reiterates the traditional critique of Böhm-Bawerk’s
objective concept of an average period of production. The average period of production is
defined as the ratio of the sum of all time periods embodied in the different, heterogeneous
labor inputs divided by the number of units of all labor inputs. By numerical examples he
shows there can be no objective measure of the average period of production, which would
ensure that this average period of production is always inversely related to the real rate of
interest. An analysis based on the technological ex-post concept of the average period of
production cannot perceive the problems of capital theory that arise in connection with the
intertemporal  character  of  Menger’s  Law  (i.e.  time  discounting,  the  order  of  goods,
expectations, knowledge and uncertainty). The prominent role of the average period of8
production might thus offer an explanation for the neglect of the systematic relation between
the order of goods and uncertainty in ACT. Furthermore, Samuelson fails to distinguish
between capital deepening, capital widening and more round about methods of production
that take into account the role of complementarity and indivisibility of higher order goods in
production plans.
20 Lewin (1999:64) presents a short history and summary of various strands
of  criticism  of  the  average  period  of  production.  He  dismisses  the  average  period  of
production as an inherently problematic construct.
21
Böhm-Bawerk (1921:118) introduced the average period of production mainly to be able to
cope with three problems: (i) Inputs that might have been produced a very long time ago in
the past lengthen the (historical) objective period of production almost infinitely. By relating
the amount of labor that is associated with these early inputs to the entire sum of labor inputs,
their influence on the average period of production becomes negligible. This problem does
not arise in the subjective concepts employed in this paper as it is the result of a technological
ex-post concept which includes the first act of production that would eventually be related to
any input in current production in the relevant period of production. (ii) In order to distinguish
between more or less capitalistic production processes – even if both cover equal social
periods of production but employ different inputs and different technologies – Böhm-
Bawerk’s average period of production increases as more units of labor date further back in
history. Based on this concept, he attempts to compare the degree of capitalism across
different  production  processes  and  technologies.  (iii) In order to compare degrees of
capitalism across different economies or across history, Böhm-Bawerk has to incorporate
characteristics  of  the  stage  of  capitalistic  development  within  which  the  individual
entrepreneur chooses the optimal production plan into his analysis.
22
This paper steers clear of such comparisons and consequently avoids the technological ex-9
post concept of the period of production. Its focus is restricted to subjective microeconomic
concepts (e.g. entrepreneurial decision, individual and social period of production, individual
planning horizon)
23 and a systematic relationship between the order of goods and
uncertainty.
24 It abstains from discussions of, and comparisons across different objective
technologies and from the aggregation over capital goods, entrepreneurs or production
processes.
THE INDIVIDUAL AND THE SOCIAL PERIOD OF PRODUCTION, AND THE PLANNING HORIZON
The individual period of production is defined as the time that is expected to elapse between
the beginning of a production process of order i and the expected date of sale for the final
good. This can be of the order i or of any order j (for 1 ≤ j < i) depending on the degree of
vertical integration. The individual period of production cannot be measured objectively. It is
endogenous to the investment decision – it might be shortened by an increase of inputs – and
subject to uncertainty itself, as the endpoint cannot be estimated with certainty.
25 Generally, I
refer  to  the  individual  period  of  production  at  the  profit  maximizing input-output
combination. The social period of production is defined as the time that elapses between the
initiation of a production process of the good of order i and the final sale of the related
consumption good of order 1. The two subjective and microeconomic concepts of the
individual and the social period of production are identical only in cases of complete vertical
integration.
The beginning of a production process is the moment in which (1) an entrepreneur identifies a
profit opportunity due to a difference between his expectations concerning the current
opportunity costs of some good of order i and expected future value(s) of the relevant goods
of order j (i < j ≤ 1); and (2) decides to incur opportunity costs in order to exploit the profit10
opportunity.
26 Consequently, it is a subjective notion as well, further obstructing any attempts
to measure the period of production objectively.
The beginning of the (subjective) planning horizon is independent of the time it took to
produce the inputs which are about to be employed in the production process. To induce
individuals with positive time preference rates to engage in investments that require a longer
individual period of production, their expected rate of return must be higher ceteris paribus.
The individual period of production does not necessarily span the entire period until the final
first order good is sold to the consumer.
27 In the absence of complete vertical integration it is
usually the case that the individual period of production of a good of higher order is much
shorter than the related social period of production. The individual period of production of a
good of order i can end as soon as the good is sold to the producer of a good of order (i – 1) as
an input. But that does not mean that the planning horizon ends at that point, because – as we
can infer from Menger’s Law – the value of the good of order i is a function of the expected
value of the relevant first order goods as these are a relevant factor in the valuations of good i
by the producers of a good of order (i – 1).
The fundamental propositions of the Austrian Theory of Capital can be summarized as
follows:
(1) Goods differ with regard to their causal connection to the satisfaction of human needs –
they are of different order.
(2) The value of a good of higher order is derived from the (expected) value of the relevant
subset of first order goods – Menger’s Law. The relevant subset consists of all first order
goods  with  a  direct  or  indirect  causal  relation  to  the  higher  order  good  under
consideration.11
(3) It is an empirical fact (axiom) that humans discount more distant consumption more
heavily.
(4) The time that elapses between the beginning of a particular production process and its end
is a monotonically increasing function of the order of the goods involved.
(5) More roundabout methods of production – which involve goods of a higher order than less
roundabout methods – must yield a higher (expected) return.
The distinction of an individual and a social period of production poses some interesting
problems for ACT, if the production process is not completely vertically integrated: In those
cases the individual and the social period of production are not identical. The individual
period of production is not connected to the order of goods: The individual period of
production of a good of order i is not necessarily longer than the individual period of
production of a good of order j (for j < i). The individual period of production of a good is a
characteristic of the available production processes, the application rate and of strategic
decisions related to the degree of vertical integration but not a characteristic of its goods-
character. Since the order of a good is independent of its physical characteristics, the order of
goods is not related to the individual period of production. An entrepreneur discounts only
over the period that he ex-ante expects to elapse between his investment and the receipt of his
revenue.  That  period  is  identical  to  the  individual  period  of  production.  Therefore,
discounting over the entire social period of production is only possible, if the production
process is completely vertically integrated. Otherwise, the discounting of all individual
entrepreneurs whose individual periods of production sum up to the corresponding social
period of production has to be taken into consideration. The market rate of interest, its term
structure, the related expectations, and the expected effects on the demand function for the12
relevant goods of lower order determine the combined effect of the individual acts of
discounting along the production process.
28 The planning horizon and the social period of
production are both related to the goods-character. For a particular production process, they
are both monotonically increasing functions of the order of goods.
Furthermore, problems of dispersed knowledge in society are hardly mentioned in ACT. That
seems to imply that complete information is assumed throughout any capital theoretic
argument in Austrian Economics.
29 Although it is only future (expected) values that are to be
considered, neither uncertainty nor incomplete knowledge receive much attention in the
arguments. The decomposition of the aggregate “goods” has to be based on two dimensions:
time and uncertainty. “Again and again Menger stresses the time dimension of goods and the
amount of uncertainty this entails.” (Streissler (1973:163); original emphasis). Over the past
one hundred years, ACT was centered solely on the time dimension – the (social) period of
production.
Following Böhm-Bawerk (1921:112) I will rely on the empirical regularity that the social
period of production and the planning horizon increase with the degree of roundaboutness of a
production process and that the production of higher order goods is associated with a longer
social period of production and a longer planning horizon than the production of lower order
goods (at given technology – or a given stock of knowledge
30 – shared by all). The following
sections stress the importance of uncertainty in the Austrian School of Economics and attempt
to introduce the dimension of uncertainty into ACT by systematically relating uncertainty to
the structure of goods.
2. Uncertainty in Austrian Economics
According to Machlup six ideas are widely believed to have been central to the Austrian13
School of economics prior to WWII
31: (a) methodological individualism, (b) methodological
subjectivism, (c)  marginalism, (d)  emphasis  on  subjective  value  in  price  theory,  (e)
opportunity costs, and (f) time structure of consumption and production. As the Austrian
School is one of the foundations of modern neoclassical economics it is not surprising that
many of the above ideas are now more or less accepted within the economics profession.
In due course of the planning debate in the 1930s, it became apparent that the mainstream of
economic theory – which was supposed to be securely rooted in Austrian ideas – arrived at
very different conclusions about the possibility of social planning than the Austrians did. In
the light of the results by Oskar Lange the Austrians noticed how far away the mainstream
had drifted from their own ideas in the 1920s. In two papers Hayek (1937, 1971) emphasized
the central role of knowledge and uncertainty in economics. In order to distinguish themselves
from  the  mainstream  further  characteristics  of  Austrian  economics  were  included  in
Machlup’s list: “... (g) markets (and competition) as processes of learning and discovery, and
(h) the individual decision as an act of choice in an essentially uncertain context ... It is these
latter ideas that have come to be developed in, and made central to the revived attention to the
Austrian tradition ...” (Kirzner (1987:149)).
32
Nevertheless, uncertainty was already central to Menger’s Principles. The quality and
quantity of the output of a particular production process is subject to uncertainty for two
reasons: (i) not all the relevant factors influencing the relation between inputs and output of a
particular production process are known, (ii) not all of the relevant factors can be controlled
completely.
33 Streissler (1973:161) highlights that Menger’s theory is an information theory
emphasizing uncertainty. Menger stressed that the value of higher order goods is essentially
dependent upon expected value of lower order goods.
3414
In his Principles Menger (1950:160) assigns four essential functions to entrepreneurial
activities: (a) gathering the necessary information about the economic situation, (b) ensuring
the efficiency of the production plan by the appropriate calculations, (c) actually undertaking
the task (the necessary act of will), and (d) undertaking the supervision of the production
processes to ensure its efficiency. He explicitly excludes risk (or uncertainty) bearing from
this list which could be an explanation for the apparent discrepancy between Menger’s
emphasis on expected values and his neglect of the systematic relationship between the order
of goods and uncertainty in capital theory.
35
Borch (1972:33) offers another explanation by arguing that Menger deliberately neglected
uncertainty with regard to expected demand. As he assumed the Principles were but the first
part of a more complete series, he focused on a fundamental theory of price formation. The
more advanced issues – e.g. uncertainty with regard to expected demand – were supposed to
be discussed in the parts following the Principles.
Yet, another explanation is that the Austrians implicitly assume perfect information in ACT.
Due to the fact that the importance of information, knowledge and its dispersion in society are
stressed by Menger and Hayek, this argument does not seem particularly appealing. Böhm-
Bawerk (1889:258) explicitly discusses the issues of expected value, the certainty equivalent
and the risk premium at some detail. Any choice between different uses of a certain higher
order good is based on discounted current value units (‘detaxierter Gegenwartswerth’ Böhm-
Bawerk 1889:325) but risk (or uncertainty) has no bearing on the real rate of interest apart
from a risk premium that has to be deducted from the nominal rate just like transaction costs
and the rate of depreciation (Böhm-Bawerk 1889:261, Hennings 1997:116). The relation
between the order of a good and productivity is related to time alone and not to risk (or
uncertainty). The systematic relationship between the structure of capital and the risk15
premium is not touched upon at all.
Hayek (1941:330) stresses that the stock of capital largely depends on the correct foresight of
the entrepreneur regarding the future situation in a world of uncertainty. Furthermore, he
briefly discusses how capitalists should treat extraordinary profits due to risky undertakings
(1941:332) and the consequences of savings exceeding, or falling short of expectations
(1941:344). Notwithstanding, Hayek (1941) does not pay attention to the relationship between
uncertainty and the structure of capital. Kirzner (1996:43, 22, 39, 40) emphasizes the forward
looking nature of the planning horizon, the role of expectations concerning the plans of
producers of lower order goods as well as consumers and the potential for entrepreneurial
error. In his discussion of the latter he briefly mentions that as time passes the evidence of
error becomes clearer.
36 Nonetheless, also  Kirzner (1996) fails to develop the systematic
relationship between uncertainty and the order of goods.
In contemporary Austrian Economics there are some instances where the role of risk (or
uncertainty) in ACT briefly discussed.
37 Garrison (1994:120) points out that the interest rate
consists of three components: an underlying time discount, an inflation premium, and a risk
premium. He further emphasizes that Hayekian capital theory focused on the first component
only. Garrison (1994:122) develops the fundamentals of a business cycle theory based on
policy induced market failure to allocate risk according to individual risk preferences.
38 In due
course of his argument, he postulates that long-term investment is inherently more risky than
short-term investment as a shorter planning horizon leaves less room for (negative or
distorting) policy surprises. However, the systematic relation between the order of goods and
uncertainty is not further discussed. Cowen (1997) develops a risk-based theory of the
business cycle that emphasizes increases in the risk of the economy as a consequence of a
decline in the real interest rate. One of the fundamental assumptions underlying his theory is16
the relationship between the length of the planning horizon and the risk associated with an
investment project.
39 Although Cowen mentions information-sensitivity in his argument
concerning this assumption, he does not develop a systematic relationship between the order
of  goods  and  uncertainty.  Lewin  (1997a,b)  points  out  that  time  and  the  presence  of
uncertainty are essentially interrelated in the notion of subjective time preference so that the
pure time preference theory of interest incorporates implications of uncertainty even if the
expected future income stream under consideration is not subject to uncertainty itself. This
however is something else than recognizing the systematic relationship between the structure
of capital, the value of capital and the uncertainty of the expected future income stream
derived from final consumption via the stages of production.
3. The Introduction of Uncertainty in ACT – A Systematic Relationship
between the Stages of Production and Uncertainty
COMPLETE VERTICAL INTEGRATION
In the case of complete vertical integration the production time a particular producer faces
equals the entire expected time period that elapses between the initiation of the production
process and the sale of the related consumer good(s). The individual period of production is
equal to the social period of production as well as the planning horizon. The discounted
present value of the proceeds from this sale depend on the discount factor and the expected
market revenue. It is therefore necessary to form expectations of the future demand of the
consumption good x1.
40 Since the value of any particular good is ultimately derived from the
value of first order goods, the primary source of uncertainty is the variation of future
consumption demand for the relevant first order good(s). In addition to forecast the aggregate
(industry) demand curve, entrepreneurs need to derive the individual demand curve they face17
based on estimates of the supply conditions and prices of other sellers.
41
The process of adjustment can be interpreted as a process of learning.
42 Hayek (1937)
illustrates the point by the use of an example: Entrepreneurs invest to produce a certain
number of houses and at the same time consumers save in order to be able to afford these
houses in the future. Their plans are coordinated by continuous adjustment based on relative
prices. The ex-ante equilibrium of plans – i.e. all plans are mutually consistent – which is
established by relative prices has to be continuously adjusted to changes in the exogenous
data on which the underlying individual decisions are based. After each change of data
relative prices adjust and individual plans are adapted to the new environment. The longer the
planning horizon under consideration the more changes of data occur and the more frequently
individual plans have to be adapted. The notion of a tendency towards (ex-post) equilibrium,
therefore, is an empirical one referring to the final outcome of the co-ordination of individual
plans.
“It can hardly mean anything but that, under certain conditions, the knowledge
and intentions of the different members of society are supposed to come more and
more into agreement or, to put the same thing in less general and less exact but
more concrete terms, that the expectations of the people and particularly of the
entrepreneurs will become more and more correct.” (Hayek 1937:45).
Expectations cannot become more and more correct unless one interprets Hayek from a
probabilistic  point  of  view:  Correctness  is  not  a  continuously  scalable  attribution  –
expectations can either be correct or they can be incorrect. But the confidence of individuals
in the subjective probability assignments can increase over time. Equilibrium is reached when
expectations tend towards a situation where all ex-ante plans are ex-post consistent. In
equilibrium  everybody  possesses  all  the  relevant  knowledge.  How  knowledge  is
communicated and acquired is one of the central research agendas in economics, according to
Hayek (1937:50).18
Possible changes in the technology of production of lower order goods and potential shifts of
the market supply curve due to changes in the supplies of the relevant competitors constitute
further dimensions of uncertainty: The expected profit associated with the underlying profit
opportunity changes.
Prima  facie,  there  is  no  systematic  relationship  between  the  different  dimensions  of
uncertainty: (1) variations in the demand for the relevant first order good(s), (2) potential
changes in technology, and (3) potential changes in the market supply curve for the higher
order good under consideration. Furthermore, there is no systematic relationship between the
variations of the different variables over time.
Consequently, the level of uncertainty related to demand of a higher order good is an
increasing function of the time period s – the planning horizon at given levels of capital
specifity.
43 If specifity changes, the pattern of correlation of different uses of the capital good
might affect the volatility of its demand, i.e. a decrease in specifity at a given pattern of
correlation between the valuations of the output of different uses of a good of order i at the
stages j (j < i) will reduce the uncertainty associated with the production of a good of order i.
But specifity is neither systematically related to the order of a good, nor are its effects on
uncertainty unambiguous as they depend on the pattern of correlation between the valuations
of the output of different uses of a good of order i at the stages j (j < i).
Uncertainty is systematically related to the structure of capital. Given that individuals are
uncertainty averse, any investment project that requires a more roundabout method of
production will require a higher marginal utility of expected return not only to compensate for
the additional time, but in the case of uncertainty averse individuals, also for the additional
uncertainty involved.19
VERTICAL DISINTEGRATION
If the theory of production is understood as a subjective theory, it must be modeled as a
decision theory. In the absence of vertical integration, the relevant production time – a
particular producer faces – is the time that is expected to elapse between the beginning of a
production process of order i and the expected date of sale of the final good of the i
th order.
This is the period between investment and realization of revenues, i.e. the period over which
entrepreneurs have to discount expected revenues and returns. The individual period of
production is shorter than the social period of production. In the case considered here
(complete vertical disintegration) it spans a single stage of production only. The relevant
expectations have to concern the demand for the i
th order good as an input in the production of
a good of the (i – 1)
th order the producer under consideration will face.
“But due to the causal connections between goods, the value of goods of higher
order goods is not measured directly by the expected importance of the final
satisfaction, but rather by the expected value of the corresponding goods of lower
order.” (Menger 1950:152).
Apparently, the value of a good of order i is a function of consumption demand for all the first
order goods which are eventually produced by employing the i
th order good as an input.
Therefore the planning horizon spans the entire social period of production from the first time
a particular producer purposefully interferes
44 to the time in which he expects the demand for
the relevant first order goods to be realized and all uncertainty with respect to it to be
resolved. If feasible, his expectations concerning the value of the relevant first order goods
could enhance his ability to anticipate decisions and valuations of producers of lower goods,
i.e. they could decrease the ambiguity and increase the confidence of expectations (i.e. of the
non-additive subjective probabilities) of the producer of a good of order i concerning the
valuations of good i by the producers of a good of order j (j < i).
45 The planning horizon spans
the entire social period of production. As in the case of complete vertical integration20
the uncertainty associated with the underlying demand for the relevant first order good
increases with the length of the planning horizon, i.e. with time. For the moment I shall
assume that it is only systematically related to time, but not the order of the good (i.e. the
number of intermediary producers of lower order goods) under consideration.
In addition to the planning horizon and its relation to uncertainty concerning the expected
future demand for the relevant first order good(s), there are two more dimensions of
uncertainty which are related to the order of goods. Even if one knew the future demand for
all relevant first order goods with certainty, the derivation of demand for the i
th order good of
a specific producer is not trivial. Due to (1) product and process innovations the optimal input
ratio might change at any stage j (1 ≤ j < i) and below. Alternatively, even if production
technologies remain unchanged, (2) producers at stages j (1 ≤ j < i) might restructure their
supply chains, and (3) the market share of producers at stages j (1 ≤ j < i) might  change
independently of the demand for the relevant first order goods (e.g. due to activities of their
competitors).
Potential shifts of the market supply curve due to changes in the supplies of the relevant
competitors of the good of order i are not systematically related to order of the good. The
level of uncertainty associated with such potential changes is a monotonically increasing
function of time. The individual period of production, though, is not necessarily longer for a
good of order i than for a good of order j (1 ≤ j < i), if the production process is not
characterized by complete vertical integration.
The variations related to the four different dimensions of uncertainty – namely (1) potential
changes in market demand for the relevant consumption goods over time, and (2) potential
changes in the optimal input/output relation due to product and process innovations at stages j21
(j < i), (3) potential changes of the structure of the supply chain at stages j (1 ≤ j < i), and (4)
changes of  market share of producers at stages j (1 ≤ j < i) independently of the demand for
the relevant first order goods – are not systematically related to each other.
Consequently,  the  level  of  uncertainty  of  the  demand  for  the  good  of  order  i is a
monotonically increasing function of the planning horizon as well as a monotonically
increasing function of the order goods at given levels of capital specifity. It is an increasing
function of the time interval (the planning horizon but not of the individual period of
production) over which expectations have to be formed. But it is also a monotonically
increasing function of the order of the good under consideration due to an increase in the
number of intermediaries and potential changes in the demand for higher order goods at each
stage of production j (1 ≤ j < i). We can, therefore, conclude that uncertainty and the structure
of production are systematically related. Investment projects that involve a more roundabout
method of production (in terms of both, the planning horizon and the order of goods
46) must
yield a higher marginal utility of returns if individuals are uncertainty averse.
A further line of reasoning relates uncertainty and the structure of production: The assumption
that the uncertainty associated with the underlying demand for the relevant consumption
goods is a function solely of time, but otherwise independent of the order of the good shall
now be relaxed. As stated above, this assumption implies that the quality of estimates of
consumption demand is not related to the stage of the production process or to the planning
horizon directly. The quality of estimates of the future expected consumption demand is
related to the stages of production only via the dimension of time. But this would mean that
the necessary information on which to base the various estimates is available to everybody in
society. Furthermore, it would be so at the same marginal costs. Every producer has to be
informed about the relevant consumer goods markets. This is a very restrictive assumption for22
two reasons: Information about a specific consumer good market is more readily available to
those who are operating in that market, and secondly, the higher the order of a good the
harder it is to define the markets of relevant first order goods. In many cases it is impossible
to know which first order goods are produced directly or indirectly by means of the higher
order good i under consideration. Even if it were technically feasible to list all first order
goods which are produced by using as an input a special higher order good i, this information
would be very costly to collect.
“The  peculiar  character  of  the  problem  of  a  rational  economic  order  is
determined precisely by the fact that the knowledge of the circumstances of which
we must make use never exists in concentrated or integrated form but solely as the
dispersed bits of incomplete and frequently contradictory knowledge which all the
separate individuals possess.” (Hayek 1971:17).
The producer of the higher order good i does not and cannot possess all the relevant
knowledge to estimate the future demand for all relevant first order goods. This division of
knowledge has not received the appropriate attention in ACT although it is one of the central
problems in economics, according to Hayek (1937:50).
It is the distinct advantage of an economic order based on decentralized planning that the
producer of the higher order good i does not have to gather all the relevant information by
himself. It is sufficient, if it is communicated to him.
“ ... in a society in which many people collaborate, this planning, whoever does it,
will in some measure have to be based on knowledge which, in the first instance,
is not given to the planner but to somebody else, which somehow will have to be
conveyed to the planner.” (Hayek 1971:18).
It follows from Menger’s Law that changes in the estimates of the demand for the relevant
first order goods affect the expectations for the expected demand for, and the value of a higher
order good. The relevant knowledge, though, depends on particular circumstances of time and
space. And even to those who deal in first order goods directly, their future value is subject to23
uncertainty, because all they might know with certainty is based on experience about the past
and present and they, nevertheless, have to estimate the future value of the first order goods
they offer. At each stage producers add to the variation and the uncertainty related to the
incomplete knowledge of the particularities of time and space due to subjective interpretation
of the individual observations and the signals received. As the number of stages – across
which the relevant knowledge of time and space has to be conveyed – the price signals
become noisier and, thus, the signal extraction problem becomes more twisted. This line of
reasoning adds two more dimensions of uncertainty: The knowledge of (5) the composition of
the relevant set of first order goods and (6) of the relevant circumstances of time and space to
form expectations of prices of the relevant first goods is conveyed to producers of higher
order goods at decreasing quality. As this knowledge becomes the fundamental factor in
forming expectations of the prices producers of goods of the (i – 1) are willing to pay, the
uncertainty associated with these expectations increases with the order of goods.
It is important to distinguish between the following dimensions of uncertainty concerning
expected future consumption demand: (i) Uncertainty that is the consequence of incomplete
knowledge about the composition of the set of relevant first order goods and the factors
underlying their (expected) value as observed by those who convey that information to the
entrepreneur of stage i. (ii) Factors that change consumption demand over time, i.e. after it
has been conveyed to the next stage in the production process – e.g. changes of consumer
preferences, product innovations or macroeconomic shocks. While (i) is related to the order of
goods, (ii) is related to the individual period of production which is independent of the order
of goods in the case of complete vertical disintegration.
One might argue that statistical information about consumption demand is readily available in
any industrialized country. Furthermore, this information is usually very cheap, because it is24
provided by public institutions (e.g. national statistical offices, ministries etc.) for public use.
The very nature of statistical aggregates, though, renders them useless for most of the
investment decisions under consideration, as they abstract from all changes within the
aggregate. Since entrepreneurs need to estimate the consumer demand for the goods which
influence the future expected value of the higher order goods they produce, any data on
aggregate consumer demand might be helpful but by no means sufficient.
Prima facie, the variations resulting from the signal extraction problem, with respect to the
demand for the relevant first order good(s), are neither systematically related across stages of
production,  nor  to  the  other  for  dimensions  of  uncertainty  in  the  case  of  vertical
disintegration
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If one accepts that the value of a higher good is deduced from the future expected value of the
relevant first order goods and that this knowledge is – to a large extent – only available to
those who deal in first order goods, one must also accept that the uncertainty associated with
the expected future demand for a good of order i at the stage (i – 1) is increasing in the order
of goods, since it increases (1) with uncertainty associated with the demand for the underlying
first order goods which in turn increases over time as the length of the planning horizon
increases, and with the order of goods as (2) potential changes in the optimal input/output
relation due to product and process innovations at various stages of production, (3) potential
changes of the structure of the supply chain at stages j (1 ≤ j < i), (4) potential changes in the
market shares of producers at stages j (j < i), (5) knowledge about the composition of the set
of relevant consumer good(s), and (6) about the circumstances of time and space to form
expectations  about  their  prices  are  directly  related  to  the  order  of  goods.  Therefore,
uncertainty aversion implies that the expected marginal utility of returns on investments in
more roundabout production processes must be higher than in less roundabout ones (at given25
levels of capital specifity). In addition to compensate entrepreneurs for the opportunity costs
of waiting, the premium must also include the compensation for the systematic increase in
uncertainty.
Conclusion
The relevant concept in Austrian Capital Theory used to be the (social) period of production.
But if the individual decision is to be central to the argument, one must focus on the
individual period of production. In cases of complete vertical disintegration, this is the time
period which is expected to elapse between the beginning of a production process of order i
and the expected date of sale of the final good of the i
th order. This is the time interval
between the investment decision and the realization of returns. Therefore, this is the relevant
period for discounting. So that the length of the social period of production is the result of
combined individual discounting of producers at each stage of the production process. In
cases of completely vertically integrated production processes, the social and the individual
period of production are identical. The planning horizon is a subjective concept that spans the
entire social period of production irrespective of the degree of vertical integration, because the
value of any higher order good is derived from the value of the corresponding first order
goods.
This paper introduced the systematic relationship between the order of goods and uncertainty
to ACT. Based on the Hayekian arguments in the planning debate, it has been demonstrated
that uncertainty is inherently related to the structure of capital. The fundamental propositions
of the Austrian Theory of Capital (see pp. 10) have to be amended by the following
propositions:26
Complete vertical integration
(4a) The level of uncertainty of the demand for a good of order i is related to the expected
value of future demand of the relevant first goods. It is a monotonically increasing function of
the  planning  horizon  (time)  –  at  given  levels  of  capital  specifity.  The  dimensions  of
uncertainty are (1) potential changes in expected demand for the relevant first order goods, (2)
potential changes in the technology used in production, (3) potential changes in the market
supply curve (e.g. due to change in the production technology of competitors).
Vertical disintegration
(4b) The level of uncertainty of the demand for the good of order i is a monotonically
increasing function of planning horizon, of time and the order of the good (at given levels of
capital specifity). The uncertainty associated with the expected future demand for a good of
order i at the stage (i – 1) is increasing in the order of goods, since it increases (1) with
uncertainty associated with the demand for the underlying first order goods which in turn
increases over time as the length of the planning horizon increases, and with the order of
goods as (2) potential changes in the optimal input/output relation due to product and process
innovations at various stages of production, (3) potential changes of the structure of the
supply chain at stages j (1 ≤ j < i), (4) potential changes in the market shares of producers at
stages j (j < i), (5) knowledge about the composition of the set of relevant consumer good(s),
and (6) about the circumstances of time and space to form expectations about their prices are
directly  related  to  the  order  of  goods.  The  dimensions  of  uncertainty (2) to (6)  are
systematically related to the order of the good.
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(5a) More roundabout methods of production – which involve goods of a higher order than
less roundabout methods – must yield a higher expected return. In addition to compensate27
entrepreneurs for the opportunity costs of waiting, the premium must also include the
compensation for the systematic increase in uncertainty.
In order to establish a systematic relation between the structure of capital and uncertainty, I
only have to assume that individuals are aware of the relative dimensions of uncertainty
across time or between different investment projects, i.e. that they are aware of their own
relative planning horizons and/or the relative structures of production. Still, that does not
imply that they know the order of the goods they are producing, let alone that the order of
goods could be defined objectively.
How does the introduction of uncertainty influence the traditional arguments in the Austrian
Theory of the Business Cycle? In a first attempt to analyze this question, Schmitz (1999) uses
the model of a risk-averse bank to analyze the effects of changes in liquidity reserves
49 on the
degree of relative risk aversion. The distribution of payoffs the bank faces, is assumed to be
contingent on the loan rate. Under certain conditions, credit rationing results from the model.
A decrease in the liquidity position of the bank results in an increase in the degree of relative
risk aversion under the very same conditions. It is demonstrated that the Hayekian analysis
can incorporate the dimension of risk as the effects of tightening of monetary policy and
changes of bank expectations on bank lending are proofed to have identical signs. Further
research has been mentioned above and incorporates Cowen (1997) and Garrison (1994).
Beyond these first attempts probing this problem, further research needs to be initiated in this
area.
Preliminary empirical evidence is presented in Schmitz (1999). Goods included in the
wholesale and retail price indices commonly have the same physical characteristics. The
variance of the wholesale price index usually exceeds that of the retail price index. The28
systematic  relation  between  uncertainty  and  the  order  of  goods  provides  a  potential
explanation. However, further empirical research is necessary.
The complete neglect of the structural relation between uncertainty and the order of goods as
well as the dispersion of knowledge in ACT is inconsistent with the emphasis on these
concepts which characterize the Austrian School of Economics.
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18 See Hayek (1941) and Lachmann (1956:82).
19 See Streissler (1973:169).
20 See also Lachmann (1956:82-84).
21  Hayek (1941:76) calls the average period of production unnecessary and misleading. See also  Hennings
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Böhm-Bawerk’s capital theory. But he also stresses that this concept is not a conditio-sine-qua-non for ACT. See
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36 See Kirzner (1996:40).
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38 Legislative action and policy innovation distort the perception of risk bearing by lenders and induce borrowers
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actual  losses  reveal  the  actual  risks  born  by  the  lenders.  Garrison  identifies  the  Depository  Institutions
Deregulation and Monetary Control Act of 1980 and the federal deficit of the 1980’s as major distortions to the
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associated which higher expected returns (at least in equilibrium); exogenous increases in real economic risk of
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(1941:251), Hennings (1997:132) and Lewin (1999:123).
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47 The other four dimensions of uncertainty in the case of vertical disintegration are potential changes of demand
for consumption goods over time, changes of the optimal input-output ratio changes in the production of goods
of order j (1 £  j < i), the restructuring of the supply chains of producers at stages j (1 £  j < i), and changes in the
market shares of producers at stages j (1 £  j < i).33
                                                                                                                                                                   
48 In the case of vertical disintegration, dimensions of uncertainty that are related to the individual period of
production do not add systematically to the level of uncertainty of the demand for a higher order good. The
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